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Foreword 
This paper is a result of the author's summer internship assignment with Pratt & Whitney 
(P&W), one of the major manufacturers of jet engines in the world. Although P&W has 
many aspects to its business, this paper will only concentrate on P&W's large commercial 
engine business, jet engines sold to commercial airliners and cargo operations all over the 
world. 
The objectives of this paper are manifold. First, it seeks to educate the reader about the 
jet engine business, its structure and the global players involved in it. Specifically, it 
would describe how the industry structure and new trends have changed the industry's 
monopolistic competition environment. Second, the author will suggest ways in changing 
the rules of the game and developing a competitive advantage in the light of the current 
environment. Finally, the paper will touch on how challenges, opportunities and the 
dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region can change the rules of competition. This will 
emphasize the fact that although the business is global in nature, there are variations in its 
character that is region and even airline specific. These variations can be a means of 
developing a competitive advantage for Pratt & Whitney (or the other major contenders 
for that matter). 
The bulk of the information in writing this paper was obtained through the author's 
summer internship experience. This is supplemented by publicly available information 
obtained from Pratt & Whitney as well as additional library research. As a result, 
reference will only be made when the source of information can be distinctly identified. 
Information that is proprietary is either disguised or is only referred to in a very general 
manner so as to avoid violating secrecy agreements that the author has signed as a 
condition of employment with Pratt & Whitney. 
Views expressed in this paper are that of the author alone and may or may not represent 
the views of Pratt & Whitney or any of its employees. 
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I. Introduction 
The commercial jet engine business is an interesting example of a non-cooperative 
monopolistic competition. There are three major global players in the market that are 
currently engaged in bitter competition against each other. To an extent, price of the 
engines has become the bottom line differentiating factor in winning sales to major airlines. 
As a result, profitabiHty has suffered across the board and the engine makers have basically 
mortgaged their future by "giving away" engines in return for a hopefully healthy annuity 
stream from engine spare parts sales in the fixture. With engines getting more reliable and 
using fewer parts than before, quantification of this annuity remains vague. This is an 
industry gone berserk. 
The challenge now is how to stop this seeming death spiral. Applying Game Theory to 
the situation shows a future that is not bright. First, all three firms have as their dominant 
strategies to increase their engines' installed base. They all hope that annuity from spare 
parts sales could finance new engine development programs to stay ahead of competition 
while at the same time provide healthy returns to shareholders. Second, overcapacity in 
an industry that relies significantly in economies of scale by amortizing engine 
development costs to as many engines as possible makes the situation worst. There is 
therefore no Nash Equilibrium in this industry. 
The answer may He in Chamberlin's Theory of Monopolistic Condit ion. In his theory, 
ChamberUn stresses product differentiation and selling costs, pointing out that most 
companies have a market partially distinct from their competitors. Although the nature of 
the jet engine business is quite different from steel mills, an example that ChamberUn refers 
to, an expanded interpretation of his theory may be a way to alleviate the pressure on 
pricing in the jet engine market. 
An analysis of the jet engine competition would be found wanting though without a 
playing board for the competitive forces to play themselves out. This is where the 
dynamic markets of the Asia-Pacific region can provide fertile grounds for the evolution of 
a differentiation strategy. 
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n. Characteristics of the Jet Engine Business 
To understand competition and the various challenges and opportunities confronting the 
business world wide as well as the different idiosyncrasies of the various regions like the 
Asia-Pacific, it will be worth understanding the business' unique set of characteristics. 
A. Cyclical 
Like many high technology industries, the aerospace industry is very cyclical. The cycle 
mainly follows the booms and busts in the economy with some lag and is significantly 
affected by regional conflict or war as well as the prices of oil. The root cause of course is 
that less people travel during an economic downturn, when there is a war or conflict 
somewhere, and when costs of airfare are high due to higher costs of fuel. 
In the past, as the airline industry was being deregulated, the players were not as adept at 
competing with each other under totally different rules. Aircraft orders basically increased 
when passenger loads were up which also put pressure on aircraft manufacturers to launch 
new models during strong economies. However, due to the lengthy development period 
for new aircrafts and engines, launches could coincide with an economic downturn that 
then puts a lot of pressure on manufacturers to either cut prices or stop production and 
lay-off personnel. The jet engine business is significantly affected by this cycle mainly 
because the bulk of the discounting provided to airlines come from the manufacturers of 
jet engines rather than the airframers (manufacturers of airplane bodies). It is only in the 
last few years that the airlines understood the competitive environment and have therefore 
driven their companies more financially than they previously have done. This, in a way, 
has added rationality in aircraft and engine orders. 
B. Razor and Razor-Blade Business 
Unlike the airframe (aircraft frame without engines) business that generates less of its 
revenues from spare parts, the jet engine business is a razor and razor-blade business 
where jet engines are sold at break-even or even at a loss. Manufacturers then expect to 
generate revenues from the spare parts stream that flows in throughout the life of the 
engine which could be as long as 30 years. Normally, spare parts of a particular jet engine 
can only be obtained from its own manufacturer. Consequently, a jet engine can be 
cheaper than the sum of its parts. 
However, the newer jet engines today have less spare parts and are more reliable than the 
older engines. For example, 20 years ago, a 747 engine with a shop visit rate of once 
every 4,000 hours was considered good. Today, a rate of once every 10,000 hours is 
barely competitive. In addition, a high bypass engine in the 1980's would generate over 
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three times its list price over a 25 year period. Currently, the ratio has declined to just a 
little over one. 
Figure A below is a concept of a typical pay-back graph of an engine program that 
manufacturers have to deal with every time they launch a newly developed engine. 
Figure A - Engine Program Pay-back Graph 
$ millions 
- Cash Flow 
- Cummulative Cash 
Flow 
Time 
C. Revenue Sources 
Due to the size and complexity of the jet engine business it has multiple sources of 
revenues. The major sources of revenues for a jet engine manufacturer in the commercial 
arena are as follows: 
1. New Engine Sales 
Before the advent of multiple sourcing of engines, this part of a manufacturer's 
revenue source used to provide healthy margins. In the current intensely 
competitive environment however, a manufacturer will be satisfied if it only breaks 
even on engine sales. Most of the time however, the manufacturer actually does 
not make any money on new engine sales. The question posed now is how much 
is a manufacturer willing to lose on an engine sale and still be profitable in the 
long-run. 
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New engine sales are either for new airframes or replacement engines for older 
airframes. As a result, it is possible for an engine manufacturer to get into an 
airline by ousting an incumbent through replacement engine sales. 
2. New Spare Parts Sales 
This is the cash cow of an engine manufacturer and could last the whole lifetime of 
an engine which is between 25-30 years. Depending on the engine though, this 
may not kick in until the 4th to the 6th year when an engine goes for an overhaul. 
After the 6th year, the engine is considered mature and would need a steady stream 
of replacement parts. Majority of the spare parts for a particular engine are sold 
by that engine's manufacturer. A small portion are made by third party FAA 
certified parts manufacturer. Spare parts between different makers are normally 
not interchangeable therefore the higher margins generated in this part of the 
business. Historically, revenues generated from spare parts in the lifetime of an 
engine would be equivalent to more than three times the engine's list price. 
Currently, with more reliable engines with less spare parts, that revenue has come 
down to a little over an engine's list price. 
3. Surplus Spare Parts Sales 
These are basically refurbished or remanufactured spare parts. This is a growing 
business on its own as a result of the cost consciousness of the airline industry. 
Like any refurbished item, these parts may be almost as good as new but cost less 
than new. There are a few third party players in this segment whose competitive 
edge is in their being able to source, inventory and resell these parts to airlines and 
overhaul shops efficiently. However, these third party players would normally 
send the parts back to the original equipment manufacturers (either the engine 
manufacturer or its suppliers) to be refurbished and certified. This segment is 
competing and eating away business from new spare parts sales. 
4 Overhaul and Repair Services 
There are various players in the overhaul and repair services market. These 
players include: (1) the engine manufacturers themselves which set up specific 
business units to provide this service; (2) the major airlines which run their own 
overhaul facilities for their fleet as well as other airlines' fleet; and (3) engineering 
companies which may or may not be related to an airline or engine manufacturer. 
Revenues not only come from overhaul and repair services provided but also from 
spare parts repaired and replaced. Due to the strategic position of these services 





5. Marine and Industrial Turbine Applications 
With some reconfiguration, jet engine platforms can be converted to power 
generating turbines for marine and industrial applications. This business puts jet 
engine manufacturers head to head in competition against power generating 
equipment manufacturing companies and has different dynamics as compared to 
the jet engine business. This business can be run separately and generate additional 
revenues. All three major engine manufacturers have business units in this sector 
where GE Power Systems (GEPS) holds world leadership in industrial turbine 
technology. GEPS has actually built a successful high-margin business in this 
business. 
D. A Political Business 
It is common knowledge that the US aerospace industry dwarfs any other industry in 
terms of balancing the trade of the US with other countries. It is a very important industry 
both for the exports it produces and the new technology that it generates to maintain US 
leadership in commercial and military aviation. A major part of this industry is the 
development, manufacture and sale of jet engines to the world's commercial airlines. 
Approximately 25% of the value of a commercial plane is accounted for by its engines. 
Due to the importance of the aerospace sector both in the US economy as well as in its 
defense, the industry is easily affected by political events. One recent example is China 
shifting a part of its commercial aircraft orders from Boeing to Airbus just because it 
wanted to warn the US government against meddling in its internal affairs especially the 
human rights issue. This may not be detrimental to jet engine manufacturers because then-
engines are also on Airbus planes but this shows how pohtics play an important role in this 
business. Furthermore, many countries that the US export aircrafts to may have imports 
and foreign exchange controls. It is therefore critical for manufacturers in the aerospace 
industry to understand and know the pohtics and regulations of each country that they sell 
to. 
E. New Trends 
Despite the critical nature of the aerospace industry for the US balance of trade, a new 
trend has emerged. Partnerships in the development and manufacture of parts of airplanes 
and engines are increasing. This is brought about by various reasons. 
First, partnerships spread the risks in developing and manufacturing new products. For 
example, the development of a new jet engine can take up to $2 billion in development 
costs. This is excluding the fact that it may be years after a new jet engine is sold before 
the company breaks even on its investments let alone make a profit. This is one of the 
8 
reasons why General Electric Aircraft Engines (GEAE) and Pratt & Whitney (P&W) have 
established a joint venture specifically to develop the next generation of jet engines. 
Second, many of the parts of the jet engine as well as the technology for development and 
manufacturing may not He in-house. Parts sub-contractors and partners are normally more 
efficient in manufacturing a particular part versus a jet engine maker as a whole. 
Finally, with world wide partnerships come reciprocity in terms of entry into foreign 
markets. It would be easier for example to sell jet engines to Japan Airlines just because 
Pratt & Whitney may have manufacturing or technology partnerships either with them 
directly, their subsidiaries or even other Japanese businesses that they deal with. This also 
helps in the politics of trade. 
F. Customers 
Before the advent of dual or multiple engine sourcing, the customers of the jet engine 
manufacturers were the airframe manufacturers only. In the earher years, decision making 
was made by aerospace engineers as well as pilots who wanted the best that technology 
can offer on the jet engines. Since engine manufacturers were run by the same types, it 
was easy to sell the latest and the greatest. 
When dual and multiple sourcing happened, the customer base of the engine 
manufacturers grew multiple-fold overnight now to include not only airframers but also 
airline companies who made choices as to which engines go on their airplanes. First, the 
engine manufacturer had to sell to an airframer to put his engine on a particular aircraft 
most probably with another competing engine manufacturer. After that process, the 
selling to the airlines begins to make them choose a particular engine maker over another. 
These decisions are based on many factors but eventually boiled down to price when 
engine performance and reliability improved so that no engine had a distinct advantage 
over another. 
In addition, in the developing world for example, airlines are either state-owned or had 
exclusive flying rights in a particular country or both and are considered national treasures. 
To this end, the selling process also involves selling to top government officials which of 
course would have differing sets of interests of their own. Selling jet engines therefore is a 
highly complicated process of balancing interests of various constituencies involved in the 
buying process. 
It is also a fact that there are airlines that other airlines look up to in terms of their choices 
of airframes and engines. In the Asia-Pacific for example, Japan Airlines and Singapore 
Airlines hold that honor. Both are considered strategic "must wins" for the 
manufacturers. This is therefore where competition is at its fiercest since any win could 
affect future sales to other airlines as well. 
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HI. Competitive Environment 
There are three major competitors in the jet engine business who have the capability to 
design, develop, build, sell, and support commercial and military jet engines. Pratt & 
Whitney (P&W) is by far the leader in terms of a 54% market share in installed 
commercial engines world wide. The other two are General Electric Aircraft Engines 
(GEAE) and Rolls-Royce Aerospace (RR). GEAE however is fast catching up as a result 
of its being the sole engine source for the Boeing 737 aircraft, one of the largest selling 
commercial aircraft in the world today. In 1996, GEAE accounted for 44% of all Asia-
Pacific commercial engine deliveries, about half of which was for the CFM56 engine for 
the 737 aircraft. 
A. Backgrounds of the Majors 
1. Pratt & Whitney 
Pratt & Whitney has the largest installed base of all three major engine 
manufacturers due to its leadership in applying military derivative engines into the 
commercial aircraft arena after World War II. Due to some historical missteps, 
P&W has allowed encroachment by GEAE to the extent that in 1996, both 
companies' market shares in terms of aircraft deliveries were almost even. In 
addition, the recession in the airline industry starting in 1990 also drastically 
affected P&W's profitability so that it continues to downsize its work force until 
now. P&W is part of United Technologies Corporation, a diversified technology 
company with strong roots in aerospace. 
2. General Electric Aircraft Engines 
General Electric Aircraft Engines is a formidable player in the jet engine business 
today. This is due to various factors but primarily resulting from CFM56 
becoming the largest selling jet engine in history. CFM56 is the exclusive 
powerhorse for the popular Boeing 737 aircraft. Furthermore, as part of a world 
class company that is General Electric, GEAE's cost structure is still considered to 
be lower than that of P&W. GEAE seemed to have taken advantage of 
partnerships in the development and manufacturing of its jet engines more than 
P&W so that more of its engine development and manufacturing are out-sourced 
rather than done in-house. Finally, GEAE has as its captive customer the biggest 
aircraft owner in the world and the largest aircraft leasing company as well, GE 
Capital Aviation Services, Inc. (GECAS). 
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3. Roll-Royce Aerospace 
Roll-Royce Aerospace is the third of the majors. It is majority owned by 
institutional shareholders but is one of a few privatized British companies that the 
British government has perpetual rights to. This gives the company tremendous 
leverage in terms of less financial constraints as well as political backing in 
obtaining customers for its jet engines. RR is based in the UK which has a 
different way of accounting for R&D expenditure, for example, that allows RR 
greater flexibility not available to both P&W and GEAE. It also does not hurt RR 
that the British Prime Minister sometimes "closes" deals for them compared to 
maybe a Secretary of Commerce of the US for P&W and GEAE. RR is currently 
considered the loose canon in the jet engine oligopoly because of its perceived 
strategy of "buying" market share at all cost since it does not have the installed 
base of the other two majors. 
B. Market Shares 
Table A illustrates the respective market shares in terms of engine deliveries of each 
manufacturer for 1996 in the Asia-Pacific region. See Exhibit 1 for engine delivery market 
shares from 1986-1996 in the Asia-Pacific. 
Table A - Asia-Pacific Orders Market Share (1996) 
Manufacturer 
CFM (JV between GEAE and SNECMA) 
GEAE 
IAE (JV between P&W, RR and others) 
P&W 
RR 






C. No More Sole-Source 
In the 1950's and 1960's, commercial aircrafts were offered with essentially one engine 
choice. However, with the coming of widebody aircrafts in the 1960's, all three major 
engine manufacturers developed their own high-thrust turbofan engines. Since these 
engines were a significant leap in technology, technical and performance issues arose 
which resulted in competitor engines being allowed on previously exclusive aircraft 
platforms. Airframe manufacturers found that it was advantageous to have multiple 
engine types on a particular aircraft because competition by the engine manufacturers 
lowered engine prices. This in turn lowered aircraft prices accordingly. Consequently, 
lowering of aircraft prices as a whole allowed airframe manufacturers to sell more aircrafts 
to their airline customers. 
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D. Unstable Oligopoly 
With only three major jet engine manufacturers in the world the industry is oligopolistic. 
However, due to two major factors, the trio in the market has actually engaged in a brutal 
price war to gain a significant installed base. These factors are as follows: 
1. Difference in Installed Base 
The difference in the position of each company in the jet engine business does not 
allow for a stable oligopoly. While P&W established a massive installed base early 
on by successfully securing key applications of its engine on the first two US 
commercial transports and therefore established its leadership, RR has remained a 
small player while GEAE was still concentrating on the military side of its 
business. Due to the Razor and Razor-Blade framework that these manufacturers 
compete in, it is critical for the followers to gain market share to establish that 
installed base to guarantee their future survival. RR for example has been labeled 
as a company that is "buying" market share by basically giving away its engines. 
Whether or not this is an accurate description of RR's strategy remains to be seen. 
To illustrate this, some believe that RR won Singapore Airlines's Boeing 777 
orders by basically giving away its engines, in essence promising free spare parts 
for a certain period when the engines mature, and the understanding that 
Singapore Airlines' application for more gates at London's Heathrow airport will 
be looked at favorably. At first glance, this seems to support the idea that RR is 
buying" market share. However, some circles think that RR did not expect to 
win this order. Evidence to support this contention was in RR's announcement a 
week after winning the deal that it would demand a 30% price reduction over the 
1996-1997 period from its suppliers. 
2. Industry Overcapacity 
The massive overcapacity in manufacturing facilities resulting from the boom years 
before 1990 has created pressure on engine manufacturers to increase shop 
utilization through increased sales of engines. This created competition for what 
little orders were available in the market that rational pricing practices had to give. 
Overcapacity is also apparent in the overhaul and repair business especially in the 
Asia-Pacific region where the major airlines want their own engine shops. Their 
governments also encourage the trend for the technology transfers that can be 
derived from such operations. This compounds the problem by adding another 
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"requirement" in an engine sale to have a certain number of engines go through 
particular overhaul and repair shops. 
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IV. Changing the Rules of the Game 
The way the game is played right now allows for tremendous buyer power under an 
extremely competitive environment where jet engines are becoming a commodity and 
price is the only differentiating factor. For the engine manufacturers to prosper, the rules 
have to be changed. For P&W to regain its leading position in the market, it has to lead 
the change. 
A. Industry Rationalization 
To be able to compete profitably in the jet engine business, P&W needs to lead the 
rationalization of the industry. The current overcapacity in engine manufacturing as well 
as overhaul and repair facilities world wide is putting pressure on all players to lower 
prices just to maintain shop load levels. If this continues, the overcapacity in the industry 
will eventually be trimmed but at extremely high costs to engine manufacturers. This will 
result from price wars that nobody can get out of because by then, customers' 
expectations about the level of pricing may have already been set. It is only therefore 
through proactively lowering capacity across the industry that another price war can be 
avoided. 
The key to being able to lead the rationalization of capacity is cost competitiveness of 
P&W's operations. As a lower cost operator, P&W can set the tone in engine 
competition by bidding only up to where it can either break-even on a deal or make 
reasonable profits. P&W may lose business but then the competitor who obtained the 
business will lose money. In the long-run, with this discipline, only a profitable company 
will survive, be able to finance new engine development and differentiate its product 
offering that could give it a competitive edge against the competition. 
Of course, one strategy to becoming a low cost leader is to improve efficiency and 
productivity of P&W's operations as currently being done. It would take a cultural shift 
for all of P&W employees as well as good execution by its management for this strategy 
to be successful. 
Another avenue worth exploring to lower cost is outsourcing of non key activities both in 
the development of an engine as well as in its manufacturing. Some criteria for non key 
activities are: (1) P&W does not have or cannot maintain a competitive advantage in that 
activity (for example parts of an engine that do not have proprietary high technology 
content that can be manufactured by a third party more cost effectively); and (2) P&W 
services that its customers do not perceive to add value to their operations. 
In growing the overhaul and repair business to capture more of the value adding work for 
P&W, it should concentrate in identifying key facilities world wide and purchase them 
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instead of building new ones. Not only does P&W identify key facilities to own and 
operate but also some to take out to rationalize overcapacity in the business. Hopefully, 
P&W can then capture the business of the closed facilities to increase shop load for 
P&W's other facilities. 
Partnership with another jet engine manufacturer in developing and manufacturing new 
engines would also improve the competitive environment in the industry. In fact, GEAE 
and P&W are already in the process of finalizing their partnership to develop an engine for 
the future versions of the Boeing 747 jumbo jet. Whether this partnership succeeds will 
remain to be seen especially when there is so much mistrust between GEAE and P&W. 
B. Value Added Work 
To be successfixl and profitable, a company can only cut so much of its costs. To grow, it 
would have to increase its revenue line as well. For P&W, this would mean being able to 
deliver value to its customers that they are willing to pay for. An anecdote in a Boeing 
company video captures the concept of value adding work to the customer. It tells of a 
manager of Boeing who told Bob Crandall (CEO of American Airlines) that it is very 
expensive to develop a new aircraft. Bob Crandall responded: "here's a quarter, call 
someone who cares." At the end of the day, P&W can only sell what the customer is 
willing to buy at a certain price. 
With the advent of competition in the Asia-Pacific airline industry, adding value means 
lowering the cost of ownership of engines to airlines. This does not necessarily mean 
lower priced engines or cheaper spare parts which means lower margins on spare parts to 
P&W. An analysis of an airline's cost structure shows that only 3% of it is accounted for 
by engine maintenance. P&W can therefore keep the margins on spare parts without 
upsetting a customer but P&W has to work on helping customers address their top 
priorities. These priorities are reducing cost of the airline's engineering and maintenance 
staff as well as its financing expenses. These costs account for a bigger share of the pie 
than just engine maintenance. 
To this end, P&W should develop the capability to offer flexible plans and packages that 
would suit individual airline needs. These packages can range in how all-encompassing 
they are from a power-by-the-hour package to just managing inventory of used and 
refurbished spare parts that airlines can use at lower costs. The power-by-the-hour 
concept is very similar to car manufacturers who lease a fleet of cars to rental companies 
as well as corporations who do not want to own nor maintain the assets themselves. 
Airlines, especially the smaller and newer ones may take advantage of this and only do 
what their core competencies are, like providing passenger reservation system, flight crew 
and cabin attendants and route systems. 
It may be difficult however to offer a package only on the engines since airlines normally 
buy aircrafts as a whole. In this regard, P&W may be at a disadvantage compared to 
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GEAE. Unlike GEAE, P&W does not have an aircraft leasing company as a sister 
company. Nevertheless, P&W could still partner with the other aircraft leasing 
companies such as the International Leasing and Finance Company (ILFC), the second 
largest aircraft leasing company in the world, second only to GECAS. Or, it may want to 
buy the smaller players in the aircraft leasing business should the industry trend require 
this. 
Another aspect in lowering the cost of ownership of jet engines to airlines is continually 
improving the engines' reliability. This will allow airlines to avoid costly delays and 
airport charges when a plane cannot leave on time due to engine trouble. Since reliabihty 
of engines always improves over time after its introduction into service, the competitive 
advantage that can be gained here is to be able to introduce engines that are reliable 
starting from day one. The PW4098, a P&W engine on the Boeing 777, obtained 180 
minutes ETOPS (Extended-range Twin-engine Operations) certification on its first 
commercial flight. This is a historic achievement since the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) normally only grants 60 minutes ETOPS certification in the first 
year of a twin-engine aircraft. This allows aircrafts to only fly routes that at any point in 
time are only one hour away from the nearest airport. With 180 minutes ETOPS, a twin-
jet is reliable enough to virtually fly anywhere in the world. 
C. Change Customer Perception 
Not only should P&W provide value added work for its customers, but it should also be 
able to communicate this value to them Since airlines are now very financially driven, the 
way to communicate P&W's value proposition in selling its engines is to quantify the 
bottom line effects to the airlines in purchasing a P&W engine as compared to say GEAE. 
This quantification may include less maintenance time for more reliable engines which 
means the planes fly more often and therefore generate revenues for the airline. 
In addition, P&W should enhance its customer service to all the constituents of its selling 
process with its airline customers. It will have to be responsive, and perceived as so, by 
the different people in the airlines. To be able to do this, P&W has to first segment its 
airline customers according to their strategic objectives, financial resources, mode of 
operation as well as its needs. The next step is then to understand the goals and interests 
of each constituent clearly and address them individually. For example, the finance 
department will be more concerned with the return on assets figures while the engineering 
and maintenance department may be more concerned with availability of spare parts when 
required. These constituents are rewarded differently and the sales people at P&W should 
be aware of this. 
In most Asian countries, relationships hold a significant role in any transaction. These 
relationships cannot be developed overnight and therefore to succeed, P&W should be 
able to put in place a structure that addresses this character of doing business in the Asia-
Pacific. One way of doing this is to transfer decision making authority, up to a certain 
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extent, into the region. P&W, like GEAE is now in the process of appointing General 
Managers for each of the major airlines in the region as well as General Managers 
responsible for smaller airlines in a particular country or group of countries. The key to 
success in implementing this change in organization is for these General Managers to be 
perceived by their customers as having enough power and clout to obtain what they need 
from headquarters to delight their customers. Moreover, these General Managers will 
have to be well liked by their airline customers as well as the government officials that 
have any role in a particular country's airline industry. 
Finally, this will not come easy for organizations the size of P&W with all its internal 
politics and so this structure has to be continually championed by the company's top 
executiyes and reinforced accordingly by realigning the reward system of the whole 
organization. Precursor to delighting one's customers is delighting one's employees for 
they are the voice of the organization. With the current reorganization and downsizing of 
P&W's work forces, this will be a difficult feat but nonetheless will have to succeed for 
P&W to become a world class company. Asians are very "face" conscious that for them 
to know that they are dealing with a world class company (strong brand image, 
professional management, and reliable products and services) goes a long way. 
Pratt & Whitney has to go back to its roots as captured by its logo that says "Dependable 
Engines" and interpret that beyond technology to encompass all concerns of its customers. 
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V. Asia-Pacific Market Overview 
The Asia-Pacific market is currently the fastest growing region in the world and is 
projected to remain that way in the next decade. There is a rapid expansion of the middle 
class as well as the generation of new wealth. Table B illustrates a sampling of growth 
figures of various Asia-Pacific countries. 
























For a comparison to the rest of the world, see Exhibit 2 for the regional economic growth 
rates and Exhibit 3 for a comparison with world GDP growth rates. 
A. Developments in the Asia-Pacific Airline Industry 
Historically, the Asia-Pacific airline industry has been dominated by country flag carriers 
normally owned by the state. These airlines had virtual monopoly of the air trafl&c in their 
particular countries and were treated like another type of utility company. They provided 
air travel access to everybody in their respective countries even to destinations their 
governments claim to be unprofitable, much like the justification why telephone and 
electric companies were monopolies. As a result, most of these airlines were unprofitable 
and were only prop up to serve the national interests. 
Due to changes in the world economy and trade as well as the burden that these airlines 
imposed on their countries' governments, more and more of the region's airlines are being 
privatized while their airline industries are being deregulated. Take the case of the 
Philippines as an example. While Philippine Airlines (the country's flag carrier) was 
undergoing privatization, the skies were also opened up to new competition. Now, there 
are four other airlines which fly "real59 airplanes between high traffic destinations 
particularly between Manila and Cebu. 
Of course there are exceptions to this situation as well. Singapore Airlines and Cathay 
Pacific Airways (Hong Kong) are world class airlines which do not have domestic markets 




airlines' emphases on courteous customer services, they have become world class airlines 
that continue to grow by competing for other global players' passengers. 
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With competition brings pressure on airfare pricing. This in turn encourages airlines to 
I become more efficient to survive and prosper. With lower prices, demand for air travel 
increases. As a result of more airline operators and more passengers flying, demand for 
new and better aircraft that suits the region and the routes well increases. Countries like 
China, South Korea, Japan and Indonesia are now planning to be the first to launch their 
own homegrown regional twinjet (100-120 seater) that would efficiently serve many 
destinations in the region. 
Despite these positive trends however, the selling process to the airline industry in the 
Asia-Pacific is still very complicated compared to what companies may be used to in the 
West. This is mainly driven by a few factors. First, since aircrafts are expensive capital 
items, selling a few to a small developing country affects the balance of trade and 
exchange rates significantly which may lead to some disruptions in its economy. As a 
result, in some countries, import restrictions are imposed on airlines which pressures 
airframe and engine manufacturers wishing to sell to those countries to provide counter-
trade arrangements for those countries' products. Second, the airline industry in many 
Asia-Pacific countries are still highly pohticized because most of the flag carriers are still 
state-owned enterprises. Even if an airline is not state-owned, due to its nature, politicians 
still do meddle in their affairs. 
B. Future Growth Drivers 
Besides the demand drivers mentioned earlier, the Asia-Pacific market has its own specific 
future growth drivers for its airline industries and thus airframe and engine sales. 
First, there is the growing affluence of the population who can now afford to travel for 
leisure. This leisure travel may be overseas travel to visit relatives and friends. Second, 
there is a limited choice of transportation in the region. The road systems are not as 
extensive and good as they are in the US for example. Furthermore, due to the terrain of 
the region (mountains, jungles and islands), air travel, when available at an affordable 
price, would be the preferred choice because of convenience and speed. Finally, the 
increase in regional trade and business due to opening up of markets increases the 
demand by business travelers. 
See Exhibit 4 for the Asia-Pacific aircraft seat mile projections, Exhibit 5 for revenue 
passenger mile projections compared to that of the world and Exhibit 6 for the Asia-
Pacific aircraft demand projections. See Exhibit 7 for the Asia-Pacific engine forecast 
from 1995 to 2014. 
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C. Overview of Aerospace Industries in Selected Asia-Pacific Countries 
1. China 
In China, rapid economic growth has caused an undersupplied market. For 
example, growth in the airline industry is limited primarily by shortage of pilots to 
operate a greater number of airplanes. The break-up and newly granted autonomy 
of China's airline industry and emergence of new airlines stimulates demand 
further. US aircrafts have excellent track records in the country. Nevertheless, 
US exporters should show creativity in financing, including leasing to be able to 
tap this market. Most promising subsectors as identified by the US Department of 
Commerce (USDOC) are aircraft sales and spare parts sales with 1993 estimated 
market size of $2.4 billion and $600 million respectively. 
2. Hong Kong 
Hong Kong is situated at the geographic heart of the southeast Asia region. Most 
of the aircraft coming through this area makes Hong Kong a stop-over point, not 
only for sight-seeing and cargo transshipment but also for maintenance at the 
excellent facilities available in Hong Kong at the Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering 
Company (HAECO), the sole vendor of such services at present. When the new 
airport at Chek Lap Kok comes on line, the airport authority envisions 2-3 
suppliers of these services, thus creating more opportunities for sales. Most 
promising subsectors as identified by the USDOC are airplanes and helicopters, 
and their parts with 1993 estimated market size of $545 million and $157 million 
respectively. 
3. Indonesia 
Along with the vital role played by sea transportation in national economic 
development, civil aviation is also critical to linking the country's widely separated 
islands. In recent years, the government has been very active in the modernization 
of older airports and in building new ones throughout the country. PT Garuda, a 
state-owned company is the national flag carrier. Historically, only Sempati Air 
was allowed to use jet aircraft on domestic routes. Starting in 1992 however, 
other private domestic airlines were permitted to operate jet aircraft for domestic 
operations. Presently, three domestic airlines already operate jet airplanes in their 
fleets. One of the most promising subsector identified by the USDOC is aircraft 
engines with 1993 estimated market size of $50 million. 
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4. Japan 
While the US still maintains a commanding lead in aircraft and components 
demonstrated by the US bilateral trade surplus, Japanese aircraft exports have been 
expanding in recent years, and European manufacturers have started entry into the 
Japanese market. Cooperative ventures among US, European and Japanese firms 
have increased markedly in recent years. Most promising subsectors as identified 
by the USDOC (with their estimated market size in 1993) are civil aviation jet 
aircraft ($2.7 billion), aircraft engines and parts ($2.1 billion), and general aviation 
aircraft such as helicopters and executive jets ($90 million). 
5. South Korea 
The Korean civilian aircraft market seems to have taken off in 1993, due to 
increased demand from the two national carriers, Korean Air Lines (KAL) and 
Asiana Airlines (AAR). AAR plans to procure 51 aircraft from 1993 to 1998. 
KAL will also procure 63 aircraft by the year 2000. The government is also 
expected to approve the creation of regional commuter airlines. Most promising 
subsector identified by the USDOC is general aviation aircraft with estimated 1993 
market size of $ 1.8 billion. 
6. Malaysia 
Malaysian Airlines is undertaking a multi-billion dollar expansion program in the 
next ten years in an effort to meet the rising demand for air travel. The expansion 
will see the airline acquiring several Boeing 747-400 aircraft. Most promising 
subsectors identified by the USDOC are commercial airplanes and heMcopters with 
1993 estimated market size of $1.2 billion and $150 million respectively. 
7. Pakistan 
There are good prospects for increased sales of aircraft and parts to Pakistan. The 
government recently has allowed the private sector to own and operate airlines on 
both domestic and international routes. Pakistan International Airlines continues 
to be a major buyer of aircraft and related equipment. The drop in imports from 
the US in 1993 is attributed to aircraft rather than parts, imports of which 
increased at about 10% annually. 
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8. Philippines 
Philippine Airlines' new management is now focusing its efforts on boosting the 
flag carriers' performance in the aviation industry. PAL management plans to 
purchase new aircrafts both to supplement its current fleet as well as replace old 
airplanes. Other airlines financed by local tycoons are also entering the 
deregulating market which bodes well for new as well as used aircrafts and 
engines. The new airlines are Pacific Air, Cebu Pacific, Grand Air, and Star Asia. 
9. Singapore 
The aerospace sector continues to be one of Singapore's major industries. In 
1992, output in the aerospace sector rose by 8% to $ 731.25 million Singapore is 
evolving into a world-class aero-component manufacturing and overhaul center for 
the world market. The aircraft component overhaul and manufacturing industry 
has grown steadily at 10% annually over the last five years and is expected to 
continue growing at an accelerated pace well into the 21st century. Singapore 
Airlines expanded rapidly over the past two decades and currently maintains a fleet 
of 55 aircraft. It expects to continue expanding to meet growing passenger demand 
in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Most promising subsectors as identified by 
the USDOC are aircraft and helicopters with 1993 estimated market size of $893 
million and $ 137 million respectively. 
10. Taiwan 
Taiwan seems to have one of the most number of airlines among all Asia-Pacific 
region countries. These airlines include Eva Airlines, China Airlines (flag carrier), 
Great China Airlines, Mandarin and Far East. All have plans to procure new 
aircrafts in the next few years. Most promising subsector as identified by the 
USDOC is general aviation aircraft with 1993 estimated market size of $1.2 
billion. 
11. Thailand 
Market demand for aircraft and aircraft spare parts is based entirely on imports. 
US firms are the main suppliers for inter-continental aircraft. Airlines covering 
regional routes are supplied by both France and US firms, while domestic flights 
use aircrafts from US, France, and the UK. For aircraft spare parts, US firms 
account for about 70-80% of the import market. Since the Royal Thai 
Government plans to develop Thailand as a regional aviation hub, the future 
import market for both aircrafts and aircraft parts are promising. Thai Airways 
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International is the only major national airline. Bangkok Airways on the other 
hand has a very small annual procurement program of only a few planes per year. 
Thailand's demand for commercial aircraft is therefore based mainly on Thai 
Airway's development plan. The most promising subsectors as identified by the 
USDOC are aircraft and aircraft parts with 1993 estimated market size of $425 
million and $150 million. 
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VI. Significance of the Asia-Pacific Region 
The Asia-Pacific region is not just another fast-growing market to broaden the demand 
base of P&W. The region presents a unique set of challenges and opportunities that will 
allow P&W to change the rules of the game that would essentially achieve three things. 
• Take the engine competition from the commodity game where sales successes are 
highly and inversely correlated with price. 
• Reduce the buyer power that currently exists in the market for jet engines. 
• Put P&W in a bandwagon to reinvent itself from a jet engine manufacturer to 
something else. This something else will depend largely on the evolution of 
competition that ensues after P&W attempts to change the rules of the game. 
Discussed below are some of the unique challenges and opportunities presented by the 
Asia-Pacific region and their significance to P&W. 
A. Demand for Engines 
Based on the largest P&W customers for the PW4000 engine series, the Asia-Pacific 
seems to be the only region in the world that is actively placing orders. Table C below 
lists the largest P&W PW4000 customers in order of size of ordered engines. 
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This demand results from the growth of the airline industry in the region as well as its 
profitability. With the advent of new start-ups in the market financed by some of the 
wealthiest individuals and family groups in the region, this demand would continue to 
grow. This demand helps to alleviate the production overcapacity of P&W specifically 
and the other major engine manufacturers generally. Moreover, as a result of a dynamic 
market, the Asia-Pacific will present a good opportunity for P&W to try out new 
strategies and study the evolution of competition in responding to those strategies to see 
what works for it and what does not. 
B. Very Different Sub-markets 
The Asia-Pacific region consists of many countries with different stages of economic 
development as well as different cultures. Goals and needs of individual countries vary 
tremendously which are also reflected on the goals and needs of their airline industries. 
Consequently, this presents a tremendous opportunity for market and airline segmentation 
which results in P&W being able to address each airline's needs individually and thus be 
more successful in differentiating its "products." One model for segmentation has been 
developed by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) and this is illustrated in Table D below. 
Table D - BCG Airline Segment Model 
Airline Segment 
Weak small airlines 
Virtual airlines 
Fleet cost reducers 
Service expanders 
Description 
• regional players and route specific 
airlines 
• meager financial resources 
• prefer to lease assets 
some financing required from 
manufacturers 
• large players with strong franchise and 
customer base 
• only want assets that directly touch 
their customers 
lease assets 
• they are also known as cost minimizers 
• fly fleet at lowest costs 
low downside residual risk 
• diversify into ancillary services such as 
overhaul and repair services, food 












Understanding of the various segments and what is required to be successful in serving 
their needs would allow P&W to develop a competency to differentiate a package of 
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services to its customers. The end result would be that engine price on its own will not be 
a significant criterion in the engine selection of its customers, both the airlines as well as 
the aircraft leasing companies that are developing in the region such as Singapore Aircraft 
Leasing Enterprise (SALE). 
Based on the different segments, P&W can consider various service options and packages 
for its customers such as straight lease, equity stake, joint-venture, and power-by-the-hour 
packages. Since the current trend in the region is service expansion, as part of a package, 
P&W may opt to develop joint-ventures with the airlines or their parent companies in 
parts manufacturing, overhaul and repair services, and other services. 
C. Low Labor Costs 
Some countries in the region have skilled workforces that can be easily trained and costs 
less than their counterparts in the US. Since there is pressure from various countries in 
the region for local parts sourcing as well as technology transfer requirements when 
importing capital goods, this will be a good opportunity for P&W to both get into favor 
with the region's trade politics while at the same time gain cost advantages in parts of its 
business. 
D. No Dominant Regional Airline Yet 
Unlike North America or Europe, there is still no dominant regional airline in the Asia-
Pacific region. With continued deregulation as well as the continued evolution of ASEAN 
and the Asian Free Trade Area, this regional airline concept may become a reality. This 
will provide tremendous opportunities for up-and-comers to leapfrog the current 
contenders or to take up profitable niches in a rapidly evolving market. If P&W plays its 
cards right, it may be able to partner with an up-and-comer so that it becomes the engine 
of choice for an airline with good growth potential. 
Moreover, with new airlines starting up, P&W has the opportunity to extend the lives of 
its older engines by fitting them on to the aircrafts of start-ups who may not be able to 
afford to buy new. This will in turn assure P&W a longer stream of spare parts revenues. 
E. Bream of a Regional Jet 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, countries such as China, South Korea, Japan and 
Indonesia are racing to develop their own homegrown regional twin-jet that fits well with 
the route structures in the Asia-Pacific region. With this comes the opportunity to become 
the exclusive provider of jet engine on the most successful of these ventures. The 
challenge of course is to identify the one that is most likely to succeed given the right 
support from P&W. This again can change the rules of the game to the extent that P&W 
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does not just supply the engine but also evolves into an organization that supplies 
technology and other services as well. 
F. Source of Financing 
With the tremendous cost in developing and manufacturing of jet engines, P&W can avail, 
through partnerships and joint-ventures, of the financial capabihty of various corporations 
and institutions in the region who are supported by their governments to develop their 
countries' aerospace industry. Not only does P&W share the risk of development, with 
the right partners, it could even minimize the risk by the assurance of a ready market for 
its engines and services. 
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VII. Conclusion 
Like many other companies before it, P&W (or any of the other contenders in the jet 
engine war) will have to change the way it looks at its business and change the rules of the 
game to succeed. It will have to evolve from an engine manufacturer into something else. 
Right now, this something else is not yet apparent. It could evolve into a propulsion 
marketing company, a propulsion manufacturing integrator, a propulsion solutions 
provider or an aerospace service engineering company that supplies its own jet engines as 
well. There are various companies out there which have reinvented themselves that can 
serve as models for P&W's evolution. 
One thing is for certain though, P&W has to differentiate itself as a company from its 
competition to get itself out of a "commoditizing" business by changing the rules of the 
game. It cannot afford not to change the game anymore mainly because its customers 
have become used to the fact that for all its worth, jet engines are basically commodities 
and price is the determining factor in a successful sale. 
Despite the global nature of the jet engine business, the Asia-Pacific region provides fertile 
grounds to sow a different strategy to change the nature of competition mainly because it 
is a growth market compared to that of the mature markets of North America and Europe. 
In addition, its idiosyncrasies as described above also provide opportunities for 
differentiation which will manifest itself in terms of (1) changing (usually enlarging) the 
strategy space for each player; (2) changing the set of attainable prospects; and (3) 
changing the payoff functions. Referring back to game theory, these manifestations may 
be the key to allowing the three major players the opportunity to develop their dominant 
strategies to be different from each other to achieve a Nash Equillibrium or a stable 
oligopoly through differentiation. 
In "In the Neolithic Age" by Rudyard Kipling, the poet wrote about differentiation as 
follows: 
There are nine and sixty ways 
of constructing tribal lays, 
And every single one of them is right. 
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